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The paper offers a legal theoretical analysis of the discipl-
inary character of the contemporary practice of legal schol-
arship. It is assumed that the challenges of interdisciplinary
engagement are particularly revealing about the nature of
legal scholarship. The paper argues for an understanding of
legal scholarship that revolves around cultivating doctrinal
knowledge about law. Legal scholarship is characterised as a
normative and interpretive discipline that offers an internal-
ist and non-instrumentalist perspective on law. The paper
also argues that interdisciplinary engagement is sometimes
necessary for legal scholars because some concepts and
ideas built into the doctrinal structures of law cannot be
made fully intelligible by way of pure normative legal analy-
sis. This point is developed with the help of an epistemologi-
cal clarification of doctrinal knowledge and anchored in an
account of the practice of legal scholarship. The paper
explores the implications of this account by way of analys-
ing three paradigms of interdisciplinary engagement that
respond to distinctive challenges facing legal scholarship: (1)
understanding better the extra-legal origins of legal ideas,
(2) managing discursive encounters that can generate fric-
tions between disciplinary perspectives, and (3) building the
knowledge base to handle challenge of validating policy ini-
tiatives that aim at changing the law. In different ways, all
three challenges may require legal scholars to build compe-
tence in other disciplines. The third paradigm has particular
relevance for understanding the methodological profile of
legal scholarship. Legal scholarship is the only discipline with
specific focus on how the social environment affects the
doctrinal structures of law.
Keywords: Doctrinal knowledge, interdisciplinary scholar-
ship, interpretivism, internalism, non-instrumentalism
1 Introduction
It is fair to assume that there is significant methodologi-
cal uncertainty around the very character of legal doctri-
nal scholarship.1 It sometimes manifests itself in a sense
* Dr Matyas Bodig is Senior lecturer at the University of Aberdeen School
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1. I will use the terms ‘legal doctrinal scholarship’ and ‘legal scholarship’
interchangeably in this analysis.
of crisis among legal scholars.2 Even though it is not
particularly difficult to account for the characteristic
activities of doctrinal scholars, it is much less obvious
what qualifies their ‘doctrinal’ research as genuine,
creditable scholarship. The sense of uncertainty within
legal scholarship is often matched by a lack of under-
standing of its character on the part of other disciplines.
Memorably, in Becher and Trowler’s seminal analysis
on the culture of disciplines, legal scholarship is depict-
ed as a ‘soft applied science’, and it is made to look quite
marginal on the academic landscape.3 I believe that
addressing the tensions around legal scholarship is one
of the exciting challenges for contemporary legal theory.
The present analysis uses the resources of legal theoreti-
cal reflection to address issues about the disciplinary
character of legal scholarship. I hope to be able to shine
some light on the specific epistemological merits of a
doctrinal discipline about law. I am not one of those
who seek a way of putting to rest the uncomfortable
methodological challenges by reimagining legal scholar-
ship – often by giving up on its doctrinal orientation.4
The reasons why this crisis of identity and a sense of
marginalisation plague legal scholarship are, of course,
multifarious. Some of them are related to the gradual
shift of the academic landscape in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries (and the emergence of the modern
social sciences in particular) that was rather unfavoura-
ble for legal scholarship. One may even make the case
for the view that we have seen the emergence of an
imagery of disciplinarity (that revolves around process-
ing facts, developing general theories, and testing
hypotheses) that is not quite fitting for legal scholarship.
Some further reasons may be related to the disciplinary
culture of legal scholarship. In a discipline where the
2. ‘In the past 20 or so years the intellectual coherence of law as an aca-
demic discipline has increasingly been called into question’. S. Bartie,
‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’, 30 Legal Studies 345, at 345
(2010). See also M. Tushnet, ‘Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure’,
90 Yale Law Journal 1205 (1981). E.L. Rubin, ‘Law and the Methodolo-
gy of Law’, Wisconsin Law Review 521, at 521 (1997). M. van Hoecke
and F. Ost, ‘Legal Doctrine in Crisis: Towards European Legal Science’,
18 Legal Studies 197 (1998). J.M. Smits, ‘Redefining Normative Sci-
ence: Towards an Argumentative Discipline’, in F. Coomans, F. Grün-
feld, & M.T. Kamminga (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research
(2009) 45, at 47.
3. T. Becher and P.R. Trowler, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectu-
al Enquiry and the Culture of Disciplines (2nd ed. 2001), at 31.
4. See G. Samuel, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should
Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists’, 36 Journal of
Law and Society 431, at 449 (2009). G. Samuel, ‘Is Law Really a Social
Science?: A View from Comparative Law’, 67 Cambridge Law Journal
288, at 315 (2008).
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scholars often see themselves as ‘academic lawyers’
(rather than academics per se), there is no obvious place
for deeper methodological reflection and explicit meth-
odological controversies on the disciplinary character of
law. It is no surprise that this may make adaptation to a
changing social and academic environment slow, halting
and disorienting.
This suggests that addressing the issues of disciplinary
character and practice of legal scholarship requires us to
raise deeper and broader questions – some of which go
beyond the scope of this analysis. I do not deal here with
issues of disciplinary culture in any detail, and I do not
set out to develop a concept of disciplinarity that is more
fitting for legal scholarship – even though I acknowl-
edge that some of my claims are in need of validation
from a broader and more ambitious investigation into
the nature of legal scholarship. What I can undertake
here is an aspect of understanding better the character
of legal doctrinal scholarship as it is practised today. I
reflect on the problems of interdisciplinary engagement
in legal scholarship. I find them particularly revealing
about the character of legal scholarship.
I specifically look at interdisciplinary engagement from
the perspective of legal scholarship. I do not ask how
engagement with legal scholarship might benefit other
disciplines.5 I ask what may make interdisciplinary
engagement necessary for legal scholars in certain situa-
tions.6 Nor do I explore the specific dynamics of inter-
disciplinary cooperation (e.g. in the context of particular
research projects). What I am more interested in is the
necessity for legal scholars of building some competence
in other disciplinary perspectives. What makes it neces-
sary for legal scholars to understand what related disci-
plines have to say about a particular epistemic object
and to try to solve the methodological puzzle of accom-
modating in their work what they learn from other dis-
ciplines?
It is important to emphasise that my analysis is rooted in
a particular conception of legal doctrinal scholarship
that I have developed elsewhere7 and keep developing.
It confers on legal scholarship the function of cultivating
doctrinal knowledge about law. This conception pro-
foundly determines the way I perceive the problem of
5. Of course, some ways in which other disciplines can benefit from
engaging with legal scholarship are not hard to figure out. For example,
other disciplines (like sociology and political science) often need to fight
the intuition that doctrinal reasoning in important judicial decisions is
just window-dressing. See E.H. Tiller and F.B. Cross, ‘What is Legal
Doctrine?’, 100 Northwestern University Law Review 517 (2006).
6. I note that, for the sake of simplicity, I completely set aside the problem
of interdisciplinary engagement between doctrinal disciplines (like law
and theology). That raises significantly different methodological issues
(and it does not seem to shape the contemporary practice of legal
scholarship significantly anyway). What I deal with is the methodologi-
cal challenge of interdisciplinary engagement with non-doctrinal disci-
plines (like economics, sociology, political science, etc.). This is what
brings into sharp relief the key features of legal scholarship – its norma-
tive, interpretive, and internalist character.
7. See M. Bódig, ‘Legal Theory and Legal Doctrinal Scholarship’, 23 Cana-
dian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 483 (2010); M. Bódig, ‘Doctri-
nal Devices, Legal Expertise, Empirical Knowledge, and the Doctrinal
Structures of Causation Jurisprudence’, 1 Theory and Practice of Legis-
lation 469 (2013).
interdisciplinary engagement in legal scholarship. How-
ever, I can provide only a brief (and slightly under-
reflected) overview of this account here. (The next sec-
tion will be dedicated to it.) I leave many implications of
the salient features of legal scholarship on one side (e.g.
I do not reflect on the, otherwise hugely important,
functional connection with the legal profession and legal
education). This paper can only have a narrow focus and
relatively limited ambitions.
As to the substantive points of the paper, I argue that we
can identify a distinctive rationale for interdisciplinary
engagement in legal scholarship. Due to certain features
of law (that I address below and especially in the fourth
section), cultivating doctrinal knowledge about law
requires legal scholars to work with concepts and ideas
that cannot be made fully intelligible through mere nor-
mative legal analysis. Also, doctrinal knowledge exists in
a state of permanent renewal due to the extralegal infor-
mation flowing into legal procedures and policy debates.
In a very real sense, interdisciplinary engagement
becomes a vital aspect of maintaining and improving the
ability of legal scholarship to cultivate doctrinal knowl-
edge. However, it does not mean that there is one gener-
al pattern to the methodological challenge interdiscipli-
nary engagement poses. I believe that it is more appro-
priate to think of interdisciplinary engagement in terms
of a series of paradigms that originate from particular
(but recurrent) methodological challenges facing legal
scholars and that are related to different aspects of the
work legal scholars do. I do not set out to identify all
such paradigms. I will explore below three of them. It
seems to me that they are the ones we need to elucidate
and substantiate the points I formulate about the legal
scholarship.
I have mentioned above that I do not seek to overcome
the methodological uncertainties by reimagining legal
scholarship. In an important sense, the present analysis
is part of a broader argument about the way legal schol-
arship can become more assured about its disciplinary
identity. Even though there is a very real sense of uncer-
tainty about its role and character, legal scholarship has
also shown remarkable resilience and staying power.
Occasional attempts to reconstitute it on the model of,
say, the social sciences were frustrated time and again. It
may be a sign of the viability of a doctrinal discipline
about law. I am convinced that once we subject the epis-
temological profile of legal scholarship to more thor-
ough theoretical scrutiny, we find there a methodologi-
cal paradigm that must be an integral part of the aca-
demic landscape. There are epistemic gains to be real-
ised by doctrinal scholarship that are ripe for academic
study and that are not accessible to other disciplines.
Raising questions about interdisciplinary engagement in
legal scholarship is one of the pathways towards that
more thorough theoretical scrutiny.
Even though it is part of my ambitions to raise the pro-
file of existing legal scholarship, it does not mean that I
advocate the sort of conservatism about the practice of
legal scholarship that would leave everything as it is.
Even though legal scholarship is built on an eminently
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viable epistemological paradigm (that I will outline in
section three), currently it is not in the best shape to ful-
fil its potentials. Significant changes to the practice of
legal scholarship are inevitable (and, probably, they are
already happening8). In order for legal scholarship to be
able to preserve its doctrinal orientation, and to keep its
practices continuous with its proud historical legacy, it
must become more self-conscious about the potentials
and limitations of doctrinal disciplinarity.
More clarity about the rationale and paradigms of inter-
disciplinary engagement can be helpful in exactly this
respect. It is a good bet that interdisciplinary engage-
ment will become ever more important for legal scholar-
ship, and it will keep shaping the everyday practice of
legal scholarship. Currently, the growing practice of
interdisciplinary legal scholarship offers the best chance
to break the culture of insularity that has been a feature
of legal scholarship in many countries (and a damaging
feature at that). Legal scholars are often guided by an
intuitive sense that their scholarship is essentially differ-
ent to the works of philosophers, social scientists, or
other scholars. As I argue below, there is indeed some-
thing very specific about legal scholarship. But it is not
and never has been a justification for a culture of insu-
larity – for thinking that legal scholars can benefit little
from other disciplines. In fact, the sense of the distinc-
tiveness of legal scholarship can underlie a healthy disci-
plinary identity only if it is asserted, justified, and ade-
quately articulated. Interdisciplinary engagement con-
stitutes a discursive field where that might happen. In
that sense, more interdisciplinary engagement actually
strengthens the identity of legal scholarship as a doctri-
nal discipline. It is built into the very conceptual
dynamics of interdisciplinary engagements that it brings
into sharp relief the methodological integrity of partici-
pating disciplines. As it is engagement between disci-
plines,9 it is premised on acknowledging ineradicable
differences in disciplinary character and methodological
profile.
I have mentioned above that I trace some features of
legal scholarship to certain characteristics of law. In
order to put the claims I make in that respect into per-
spective, it may be helpful to highlight here (before we
start the more detailed analysis) that I operate with a
couple of simplifying assumptions about law. I admit
that they are open to contestation. But they are fitting
for my characterisation of legal scholarship, and I regard
them as defensible. First, the law is a normative and
institutional social practice that seeks to guide behav-
8. Fiona Cownie has shown that British law schools are becoming more
varied places than ever before – in terms of methodological credos and
research practices. See F. Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identi-
ties (2004). See also D.L. Rhode, ‘Legal Scholarship’, 115 Harvard Law
Review 1327, at 1329 (2002).
9. Cf. D.W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, 31 Journal
of Law and Society 163, at 188 (2004).
iour.10 It does that primarily by authoritatively fixing
norms (that can be formulated in terms of the rights and
obligations of recognised agents). The law is implement-
ed in procedures that facilitate argumentative engage-
ment. Secondly, the law is open to deliberate changes.
In fact, it has institutional procedures to bring about
deliberate (even planned) modifications of its normative
material. Those procedures attract extensive delibera-
tion about institutional design. The ability to engage in
debates on institutional design is an important aspect of
advanced legal competence. These two assumptions
have an implication that profoundly shapes my account
of doctrinal scholarship: the legal practice generates
fields (or arenas) of contestation. And it does that on
two basic levels. The first is the contestation on the
practical implications of the normative material. The
law is open to interpretation: it accommodates differen-
ces of opinion and functions in the face of ineradicable
disagreement. The second level is contestation on the
ways in which the law could be changed for the better.
Naturally, the two levels of contestation affect each oth-
er in many ways – creating dialectical tensions in the
legal competence of lawyers, as well as legal scholars.
2 The Character of Legal
Doctrinal Scholarship
As I have indicated above, my arguments are rooted in a
particular conception of legal doctrinal scholarship. It
confers on legal scholarship the function of cultivating
doctrinal knowledge about law. As the point about legal
scholarship and doctrinal knowledge is potentially the
most controversial aspect of my theoretical position, I
need to embed it in an epistemological clarification of
doctrinal knowledge and anchor it in account of the
practice of legal scholarship.
I do not think it is particularly difficult to provide an
abstract account of the characteristic activities of doctri-
nal scholars. Most obviously, they engage with the cur-
rent law. They develop and maintain a systemic per-
spective on existing normative materials and legal devel-
opments.11 Legal scholars work from conceptions on
how the elements of the law fit together in their respec-
tive fields, and this qualifies them for assessing whether
current developments can be reconciled with the given
normative structures of law. The systemic perspective
on the law also enables legal scholars to reorder and
‘remap’ the doctrinal structures of law when facing
sweeping changes to legal materials (as a result of major
legislative reforms or groundbreaking judicial deci-
sions). It is similarly clear that legal scholars exercise a
10. See M. Bódig, ‘The Issue of Normativity and the Methodological Impli-
cations of Interpretivism I: The Idea of Normative Guidance’, 54 Acta
Juridica Hungarica 119 (2013). Mátyás Bódig, ‘The Issue of Normativity
and the Methodological Implications of Interpretivism II: The Distinctive
Normativity of Law’, 54 Acta Juridica Hungarica 207 (2013).
11. See van Hoecke and Ost, above n. 2, at 197. Cf. N. MacCormick, Insti-
tutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007), at 6.
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sort of quality control over judicial reasoning as it is
manifested in upper court practice.12 Perhaps a bit less
obviously, they also address contested matters on the
exact normative scope of legal materials.13 These char-
acteristic activities may cover most of what legal schol-
ars do, but we should not forget that legal scholars also
characteristically engage with issues of institutional
design. It is not just that the assessment of the upsides
and downsides of the existing law can culminate in
reform proposals. Increasingly, contemporary legal
scholarship is filling with policy content, and legal
scholars often position themselves as experts on certain
policy matters (energy policy, environmental policy,
etc.).14 It is not that they claim doctrinal, as well as poli-
cy expertise. The two are intertwined because doctrinal
plausibility is a vital factor in assessing the feasibility of
policies in an institutional environment. Legal scholars
may be the ones best qualified to figure out which poli-
cies (and by what legal strategies) can be written into
law15 and also to figure out how the prospects of policies
are affected by institutional decisions (like a court rul-
ing).
I believe that these activities can be usefully understood
as manifestations of the epistemological profile of a dis-
tinctive disciplinary perspective. They hint at the meth-
odological characteristics of a normative and interpre-
tive discipline that looks at legal practices from a strong
internalist point of view.16 Let me explain briefly the
constitutive elements of this claim.
Legal scholarship is explicitly normative (as opposed to
having a hidden normative agenda – which is often the
case with some sociological and anthropological
research. It is not simply that legal scholarship deals
with the normative aspects of a social practice. More
importantly, it makes an explicit commitment to main-
tain the practice in its integrity and rationality.17 With-
out this, it could not take on the role of exercising quali-
ty control over judicial reasoning – it could not claim to
offer an insider look on legal developments and chal-
12. See H.T. Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession’, 91 Michigan Law Review 34, at 43-5 (1992).
13. I see this in human rights law in particular. We have abundant literature
on, say, whether transnational corporations have human rights respon-
sibilities. The main benefit from such analyses is a better understanding
of the scope of human rights obligations. See, e.g., A. Clapham, Human
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006). D. Kinley and J. Tadaki,
‘The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations in
International Law’, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931
(2004). E. Engle, ‘Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy
for Human Rights Violations?’, 20 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commen-
tary 287 (2006).
14. For an example from a legal scholar, see A. Boute, ‘Energy Efficiency as
a New Paradigm of the European External Energy Policy: The Case of
the EU–Russian Energy Dialogue’, 65 Europe-Asia Studies 1021 (2013).
15. As we will see, this interplay between doctrinal expertise and policy
issues is actually a major driver of interdisciplinary scholarship. I will say
more about this interplay in section 4.
16. See S. Perry, ‘Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory’, in
A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy
(1995) 97, at 98.
17. Cf. Peter Birks, ‘The Academic and the Practitioner’, 18 Legal Studies
397, at 401 (1998). See also MacCormick, above n. 11, at 6.
lenges.18 It is this ‘insider perspective’ that I point to
when characterising legal scholarship as internalist.
Actually, one of the key features of legal scholarship is
the way its normative character and internalism come to
be closely intertwined.19 Legal scholarship does not sim-
ply engage with given institutional practices: it internal-
ises their value assumptions. More specifically, a value-
laden assumption about legal practices is constitutive of
the perspective of legal scholarship: it is an improve-
ment on the normative structures of social life and the
institutional procedures of governance that they are per-
meated by legal norms.20 The authority manifested in
the legal materials commands (and warrants) respect.
Or, to put it in more abstract terms, ‘legality’ (that is,
the ideal of the ‘rule of law’ as manifested in legal practi-
ces) is an attractive value with great social and political
importance.21
We can also glean from the characteristic activities of
legal scholars that legal scholarship is interpretive in
character. It means, first of all, that legal scholarship
always remains practice specific.22 Legal scholarship
construes the normative materials as positive law – as
opposed to a repository of abstract political or moral
principles that have independent normative force
regardless of acts of enactment. An understanding of the
normative implications of the practice, the competence
criteria for participation, and the feasible ways of
improving the given practice all develop from interpre-
tive engagements with the positive law. Uniquely
among disciplines, legal scholarship does not treat the
law as the mere object of scholarly reflection: the nor-
mative content of the law also provides the conceptual
framework that one must rely on to make sense of the
legal practice.23 In fact, without an epistemologically
18. An important implication of this is that legal scholarship has a conserva-
tive streak to it. It does not mean that legal scholarship cannot embody
bold imagination on matters of institutional design or that it cannot be
fiercely critical of legal developments. But it means that its potential
radicalism is tempered by the need to remain a manifestation of an
insider perspective on the given legal practice. I will say more about
legal scholarship and institutional design in section 4.
19. Cf. C. McCrudden, ’Legal Research and the Social Sciences’, 122 Law
Quarterly Review 632, at 633 (2006).
20. It has to be noted, even though it will not be at the centre of my analy-
sis, that the unquestioning acceptance of legality as a value (and the
explicit commitment to improving the legal practice) confers an ideolog-
ical character on legal scholarship. There is no running away from this.
We should not forget that it is not that legal scholars happen to end up
advocating the value of legality (like an anthropologist may become
sympathetic to the cultural values she comes into contact with). The
commitment to the ideal of the rule of law is an internal even constitu-
tive feature. From within the perspective of legal scholarship, it cannot
be questioned. It is an ideological commitment. Note that, for Mark
Tushnet, this is the reason why legal scholarship can never be a real sci-
ence. See, e.g. Tushnet, above n. 2, at 1222.
21. See, e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), at 5. D. Sugarman,
‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook
Tradition’, in William Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law
(1986), at 27.
22. Cf. E.J. Weinrib, ‘Can Law Survive Legal Education?’, 60 Vanderbilt
Law Review 401, at 404 (2007). Dworkin (2006), above n. 21, at 2.
23. I rely here on a brilliant insight by Pauline Westerman. See P. Wester-
man, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a
Reflection of the Debate on Law’, in Mark van Hoecke (ed.), Methodol-
ogies of Legal Research (2011), at 90-4.
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plausible idea of ‘positive law’, we could not even make
sense of legal scholarship. All epistemic gains legal
scholarship offers are premised on knowing what the
law is. At the end of the day, its epistemic gains are
meaningful only for those who know the law or want to
know the law as it has been laid down by authorities.
I note that the way interpretivism plays out in legal
scholarship is crucial to understanding its distinctive
character. Interpretive engagement with normative
materials is common in other disciplines as well – most
obviously in history. Interpretive engagement combined
with explicit practical concerns can also be characteristic
of applied ethics (e.g. bioethics24). The distinctive fea-
ture is that the interpretivism of legal scholarship
revolves around the authority attributed to canonical
normative texts (i.e. positive law). In this respect, the
only other discipline on par with legal scholarship in
terms of its methodological features is theology (when it
attributes the authority of the ‘sacred’ to certain texts).
Perhaps, we can make these points clearer by drawing a
few more explicit contrasts with other disciplines. Legal
scholarship is unlike political and moral philosophy: the
latter is explicitly normative but not practice specific
and interpretive in their truth claims. Much of the prac-
tice of the social sciences is interpretive (e.g. social
anthropology), but, unlike legal scholarship, it is not
explicitly normative. Some disciplinary perspectives are
normative and offer ways of interpreting the normative
material but still remain characteristically different from
legal scholarship. For example, the economic analysis of
law (that has the methodological profile of economics)
has a normative agenda, but it is imposed on law – not
revealed from it by way of interpretive engagement with
positive law. It interprets the law from a fundamentally
extralegal normative perspective. As a result, it offers a
thoroughly instrumental perspective on law that sits
uneasily with the epistemological profile of legal doctri-
nal scholarship.25
3 Doctrinal Knowledge and
Doctrinal Scholarship
Of course, this is still not enough as an account of the
character of legal scholarship. We still miss something
essential if we remain on the level of a formal characteri-
sation of a normative and interpretive discipline. We
need to see the distinctive a point to building an aca-
demic discipline that takes this interpretive and norma-
tive approach to legal practices. As I have indicated, my
way of making sense of these characteristics is to say
that legal scholarship has the function of cultivating
24. See, e.g., H.T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (2nd ed.,
1996).
25. I believe that Ernest Weinrib was right on the point in his ‘crusade’
against the growing influence of the Economic Analysis of Law. See,
e.g., Weinrib, above n. 22, at 406-14.
doctrinal knowledge.26 Without asking a few questions
about doctrinal knowledge, my account of legal scholar-
ship would remain partly unintelligible.
In my understanding, doctrinal knowledge grows in and
around normative social practices (like the different
incarnations of law or religious practices), and it is spe-
cifically focused on their normative aspects. Mastering
doctrinal knowledge presupposes the familiarity with
the norms of the given practice (‘knowing what the rules
are’), but this is not what determines its character. Doc-
trinal knowledge builds competence about the justifica-
tory implications of the normative terms of participa-
tion. In principle, one can recite each norm of the prac-
tice and can still be incompetent in this specific sense.
Gaining doctrinal knowledge enables one to align one’s
actions and practical judgments with the normative con-
tent of the given practice – to get clear on what it takes
to act and reason without subverting its integrity. It
helps figure out how far one can go without falling foul
of the normative terms of participation. In other words,
it is knowledge fit into the normative parameters for
social practices. Importantly, it means the doctrinal
knowledge ‘internalises’ the viewpoint of the committed
participants of the practice. Doctrinal knowledge is
premised on the acceptance of normative guidance from
the relevant practice. Doctrinal knowledge is particular-
ly important for those who seek to gain competence in
navigating fields of contestation within normative prac-
tices. Doctrinal knowledge enables them to figure out
what is compatible with fidelity to the given practice –
what can be done and said without running the risk of
becoming an outsider.
A crucial implication of all this is that what mastering
doctrinal knowledge facilitates is not improved compli-
ance (and definitely not blind obedience) but the ability
to negotiate one’s options in a normatively constructed
social environment.27 In other words, doctrinal knowl-
edge thrives on contestation. In fact, doctrinal knowl-
edge comes into its own when the normative assessment
of situations is opened up for contestation within the
practice itself – that is, when the complexity of the prac-
tice leaves room for significant interpretative disagree-
ment.28 At first glance, this point may seem to be in ten-
sion with the commitment to maintaining the given
practice in its integrity (that I have emphasised above).
But it is actually the shared commitment that makes
intense contestation among the participants possible
26. As I work from a more abstract epistemological paradigm, I could not
rely on a ‘legal doctrine’ or the ‘legal doctrine’ as my basic conceptual
building block, even though they might have looked more familiar
(even plausible) for legal scholars.
27. Compliance is often a matter of basic social skills that do not require the
development of any specialised knowledge. Compliance is often and
repeat compliance is typically habitualised.
28. There is a further condition that I do not go into here. Contestation can
only shape the practice if normative disagreements are not suppressed
by unfavourable power dynamics. This concerns the sociological condi-
tions under which doctrinal knowledge can unfold and can influence
social practices.
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without the disintegration of the given practice.29 It is
more accurate to say that doctrinal knowledge thrives on
contestation that remains internal to particular norma-
tive practices.
A further implication of this inherent connection with
contestation is that doctrinal knowledge is premised on
taking a perspective on social practices that makes them
appear as dynamic and contingent constructions contin-
uously shaped by human efforts – by what participants
do about them and think of them. Doctrinal knowledge,
by generating an awareness of interpretive variability,
internal tensions, and patterns of contestation, facilitates
‘active agency’30 both among the addressees of the
norms of the given practice and, in the case of formally
institutionalised practices, the officials. Within the
bounds of fidelity to the given practices, doctrinal
knowledge brings about creative engagement with prac-
tice-related normative materials.
Crucially for my analysis, these observations suggest
that the character-defining features of legal scholarship
(that I have listed in the precious section) are actually
rooted in the epistemological profile of doctrinal knowl-
edge.31 (1) Doctrinal knowledge is practice oriented: it is
born out of engagement with the normative aspects of
social practices. (2) Doctrinal knowledge perceives prac-
tices as contingent, man-made, and subject to change. It
understands social practices as inherently precarious:
they would not survive without the commitment and
contribution of its participants. (3) Doctrinal knowledge
is practice specific and interpretative: it takes an internal
point of view to actual, historically contingent practices
and is limited to those practices in its truth claims. (4)
Doctrinal knowledge is normative and not simply
because its objects are norms and their justificatory
implications but mainly because it is adjusted to a prac-
tical orientation: accepting normative guidance from the
given practice32 and being committed to maintaining it
in its integrity. (5) And, finally, doctrinal knowledge is
noninstrumental about the practice it is related to.
29. I believe that this is one way to make sense of Dworkin’s claim that the
law is an ‘argumentative practice’. Cf., e.g., R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(1986), at 13-4.
30. Many have realised that the law operates by using, as opposed to sup-
pressing, the agency of humans. For a recent formulation of the point,
see J. Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, 43 Georgia Law
Review 1, at 26 (2008). I tie this feature to the doctrinal character of
law.
31. This close connection between doctrinal knowledge and doctrinal schol-
arship makes the functional connection between the legal profession
and legal scholarship rather obvious. Legal doctrinal scholarship exists in
a constitutive relationship with the legal profession (paradigmatically
manifested in its role in legal education). This is widely acknowledged
by scholars who reflect on the character of legal scholarship – although
they are very much divided on whether they should welcome its impli-
cations. See, e.g., C. Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary
Encounters: A Historical Narrative’, 34 Law and Society Review 911, at
925 (2000). Vick, above n. 9, at 175. S. Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy:
A Characterisation of the Discipline of Law’, in B. van Klink and S. Tae-
kema (eds.), Law and Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law
(2011). As I have indicated above, I leave on one side the rich implica-
tions of this point.
32. For my account of normative guidance, see Bódig (2013), above n. 10,
at 124-30.
Due to its special significance, we need to say more
about this final point on noninstrumentalism. I have
claimed that doctrinal knowledge answers to the episte-
mic needs of those who accept normative guidance from
the practice. This is the point that needs some elabora-
tion to get a grip on the noninstrumentalist character of
both doctrinal knowledge and legal scholarship. In the
sense relevant for us here, accepting normative guidance
does not simply mean that one factors in the norms of a
social practice in practical deliberations. It is actually a
manifestation of a specific mode of participation. Engag-
ing with the practice is never simply about how to use
its normative materials and institutional structures to
one’s subjective ends. Doctrinal knowledge is generated
in the process of not simply learning about the practice
but also learning from the practice. Its epistemic merits
are conditional on accepting that the practice has a value
content that one can access only through participation33
and that the practice engages with what a committed
participant can regard as appropriate practical objectives
and the appropriate ways of pursuing them. In that
sense, one of the very functions of doctrinal knowledge
is to shape one’s perspective on social life – one’s moral
and political outlook.34
The way doctrinal knowledge takes on a noninstrumen-
tal character helps us understand better the close con-
nection between the internalist (practice related and
practice oriented) and interpretivist features of doctrinal
knowledge, as well as doctrinal scholarship. The mere
challenge of making sense of social practices by way of
interpretive engagement with their normative materials
does not make it necessary that one takes a strong inter-
nal point of view to them.35 It becomes necessary only in
light of the commitment to maintaining the given prac-
tice in its integrity. And the epistemological justification
for that commitment lies in the conviction that a nonin-
strumentalist perspective on the given practice promises
specific epistemic gains. It is this promise of specific
epistemic gains (on values with major social signifi-
cance) that underlies the disciplinary character of legal
scholarship. This is how it can offer knowledge that oth-
er disciplinary perspectives do not have access to.
33. This claim is inspired by MacIntyre account of ‘internal goods’. See
A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed., 1984), at 190-1.
34. It is for this reason that I insist on the somewhat counterintuitive claim
that, even though its elements can be employed instrumentally, the
character of doctrinal knowledge does not fit an instrumentalist model.
One can borrow doctrinal knowledge (on what can and cannot be done
without falling foul of the norms of the given practice) with manipula-
tive or simply self-serving intentions. One may fake the commitment
implied in the idea of participation, and one may use strategically some
piece of intimate practice-related knowledge to plot one’s way around
the given practice. But it means consciously giving up on one of the
epistemic gains that define the character of doctrinal knowledge (the
capacity to shape one’s outlook on social life). In fact, it is very difficult
to provide an adequate explanation for the very emergence of doctrinal
knowledge from a purely instrumentalist perspective. No known body
of doctrinal knowledge could have developed without commitment to
maintaining the underlying social practices in their integrity.
35. Cf. Perry, above n. 16, at 123, G. Postema, ‘Jurisprudence as Practical
Philosophy’, 4 Legal Theory 329, at 341 and 350 (1998).
48
ELR December 2015 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000035
4 The Paradigms of
Interdisciplinary Engagement
It is time to test whether these considerations about
doctrinal knowledge and the character of legal scholar-
ship will help us understand better why and how inter-
disciplinary engagement makes sense for legal scholars.
Above, I distinguished between two aspects of the prac-
tice of legal scholarship: dealing with the existing legal
materials and engagement with challenges of institution-
al design. The two remain analytically distinguishable,
but they interact with each other in important ways. It
seems to me that legal scholarship of any notable quality
is very much characterised by the shuffling between the
multifarious analysis of given normative materials and
addressing issues of institutional design. Engaging with
institutional design facilitates creative approaches to the
systemic aspects of existing law. It brings home the
point that the normative elements of law are (to a vary-
ing extent) contingent. And the challenge of reforming
the law again and again raises stark questions for legal
scholarship about the ways of protecting the integrity,
coherence, and rationality of the law. Also, the concern
with institutional design brings into focus the complica-
ted relationship between the normative implications of
the existing law and considerations of public policy. If
we want to understand the problem of interdisciplinary
engagement in legal scholarship better, we need to be
able to associate its manifestations to these two aspects
of the practice of legal scholarship.
I have indicated above that I do not set out to provide a
complete theory of interdisciplinary interaction for legal
scholarship. Instead, I identify a few paradigms of inter-
disciplinary engagement for legal scholarship in order to
explore the implications of my account of doctrinal
scholarship and doctrinal knowledge. Nor do I go into
analysing the exact typology of interdisciplinary meth-
ods that legal scholars may apply. Taekema and van
Klink have already offered a useful analysis of interdis-
ciplinary methods that I do not wish to second guess
here.36 I hope that my analysis will remain largely com-
patible with theirs, and I can shift the focus to what
makes interdisciplinary engagement necessary (and ben-
eficial for legal scholarship) in certain contexts.
I have also pointed out above that, even though interdis-
ciplinary engagement in legal scholarship has broad
methodological varieties, it still has a distinctive ration-
ale (that is due to certain features of law). It is important
to elaborate on this point before we turn to the para-
digms of interdisciplinary engagement. It will help us
understand better what links the three paradigms I
address and what distinguishes them.
As to the distinctive rationale of interdisciplinary
engagement, it needs to be linked to the very function of
legal scholarship: cultivating doctrinal knowledge. What
36. S. Taekema and B. van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of
Interdisciplinary Research’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law
and Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011).
we need to keep in mind is that the challenge of cultivat-
ing doctrinal knowledge about law is complicated by the
fact that the law operates with concepts and principles
that cannot always be made fully intelligible through
normative analysis that remains internal to given legal
practices. There is a constant flow of extra-legal infor-
mation into legal procedures and practice-related policy
debates that has a pervasive impact on how the norma-
tive materials of law turn out. The law is not just a sys-
tem of action-guiding norms but a framework for delib-
eration and public justification as well,37 and, even when
it develops artificial categories (like ‘legal causation’ and
‘remoteness of damage’), the justifications it provides
for practical judgements must remain intelligible for its
addressees. The law has its own internal value struc-
tures, but they interact with a large amount of extralegal
information. As a result, doctrinal knowledge exists in a
state of permanent renewal, and legal scholarship cannot
claim exclusive semantic competence to define the cate-
gories it operates with (the way some formal sciences
like mathematics can). In an important sense, the law is
constituted as a ‘parasitic discipline’.38 And, of course, it
means that interdisciplinary engagement becomes a vital
aspect of maintaining and improving the ability of legal
scholarship to cultivate doctrinal knowledge.
If this is true, the paradigms of interdisciplinary engage-
ment must all be related to the various challenges that
the flow of extralegal information into the law poses.
This is what is reflected in the ‘paradigms’ I address
below. The first concerns gaining some interpretive
depth on the concepts and ideas deposited in law. The
second concerns situations where legal scholarship
comes into potential conflict with alternative disciplina-
ry perspectives. And the third concerns the pressure of
extra-legal considerations for altering the law.
4.1 Understanding Extralegal Origins
In a sense, the first paradigm of interdisciplinary
engagement is the most straightforward. It can be traced
back to a direct implication of a point I have made above
on the limited ‘epistemic’ reach of legal scholarship: the
conceptual elements of the current law cannot always be
made fully intelligible from an internal perspective. The
conceptual elements doctrinal structures are built from
typically have some historical depth (they did not always
mean what they mean now), and they often reflect the
impact of political controversies and compromises. Leg-
islation and adjudication are prone to be influenced by
37. Cf. G. Postema, ‘Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reason,’ in R.P.
George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (1996)
79, at 112.
38. See A. Bradney, ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’, 25 Journal of Law and
Society 71 (1998).
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broader political, social, and intellectual trends.39 Igno-
rance about this pedigree of the normative materials of
law can make legal scholarship positively implausible. It
can make the interpretive engagement with the positive
law (which is the bread and butter of legal scholarship)
shallow and erratic. It is no surprise that all legal schol-
ars demonstrate some understanding of the historical
depth of legal concepts – e.g. of the political philosophi-
cal categories that found their way to their doctrinal
arsenal (like the ‘separation of powers’, ‘sovereignty’, or
‘democracy’). This indicates how the interpretive char-
acter of legal scholarship can stimulate interdisciplinary
engagement.
Of course, merely acknowledging the impact of social
and political realities on the content of law does not nec-
essarily imply the need for genuine interdisciplinary
engagement. Most importantly, it does not necessarily
require legal scholars to build competence in other dis-
ciplines. This may come about when there is some spe-
cific doctrinal stake in gaining more clarity about the
extra-legal disciplinary roots of important legal catego-
ries. An example for this may be the engagement with
philosophical problems of corrective justice in tort
scholarship a few decades ago.40 It meant taking a far
deeper look at philosophical issues than mere doctrinal
reflection could ever warrant: it indeed meant signifi-
cant interdisciplinary engagement. The main reason for
this phenomenon was that the emergence of the eco-
nomic analysis of law made raised the stakes of debates
on tort law doctrines and generated controversies about
the very point of tort law. For those who resisted the
reconstitution of tort law along the lines of an essentially
consequentialist project, digging down to the (Aristote-
lian) philosophical origins of traditional tort law doc-
trine offered the promise of more interpretive and theo-
retical depth in their doctrinal positions. In a sense, the
motivation for interdisciplinary engagement was not just
interpretivism but the felt need to preserve the non-
instrumentalist perspective of legal scholarship.
Even though it has very significant potential to influ-
ence doctrinal debates, and it raises its own methodolog-
ical challenges (legal scholars may have difficulties with
guaranteeing that they do not misunderstand the alter-
39. I have in mind the well-documented trend shift in the United States in
the New Deal era. Before the New Deal, Supreme Court jurisprudence
was characterised by a rigid and formalistic emphasis on individual free-
dom. Infamous decisions like Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 US 45
were manifestations of this trend. The New Deal brought about a major
shift that ultimately generated the judicial activism of the Warren court
in the 1950s – with its more substantive approach to civil rights (and
the equal protection clause of the Constitution in particular). See
N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995). American legal
scholars are all aware of this impact of broader social and political
trends (and they factor it in when dealing with precedents from differ-
ent periods), but, in the context of academic writing, they could not
verify their assumptions about them without resorting to other discipli-
nary perspectives.
40. See, e.g., E. Weinrib, ‘Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law’, 2
Law and Philosophy 37 (1983). C.P. Wells, ‘Tort Law as Corrective Jus-
tice’, 88 Michigan Law Review 2348 (1990). C.H. Schroeder, ‘Correc-
tive Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law’, 38 UCLA Law Review 143
(1990). J.L. Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’,
67 Indiana Law Journal 349 (1992).
native disciplinary perspectives), I still maintain that
this is the least interesting paradigm of interdisciplinari-
ty in law. This paradigm has been present in legal schol-
arship from effectively the beginning, and its focus on
understanding better what is already in the law makes it
an unlikely candidate for being a major driver of either
doctrinal development in the law or the methodological
renewal of legal scholarship. It seems to me that the oth-
er two paradigms I address here have a more direct
bearing on the pressing methodological challenges of
contemporary legal scholarship.
4.2 Addressing Frictions between Disciplinary
Perspectives
As I have indicated, the second paradigm concerns sit-
uations where legal scholarship comes into potential
conflict with alternative disciplinary perspectives. As we
have seen, the first paradigm revolves around acknowl-
edging the limitations of legal scholarship in making
adequate sense of ideas and concepts that came to be
integrated into legal materials. It assumes a fundamen-
tally supportive relationship between legal scholarship
and the relevant other disciplines. One discipline can
lend more interpretive depth to the other. There are
cases, however, when the engagement between disci-
plines is characterised more by rivalry and even tension.
There are categories that are crucial for legal scholarship
for their doctrinal significance but other disciplines also
have significant stakes in them. Nothing guarantees that
the different disciplinary perspectives on them will not
end up at least partly incompatible. In many cases, this
raises no serious challenge because the alternative uses
of the affected concepts can be contextually separated.
(We can learn to appreciate that ‘fault’ or ‘acceptance’
means something different in law than elsewhere.)
Occasionally, however, the engagement simply cannot
be avoided, and it can even become strategically impor-
tant for legal scholarship to maintain some control over
the semantic boundaries of the relevant categories. The
internal coherence of the doctrinal structures may
depend on it. Communication and some form of accom-
modation are unavoidable.
I think I can best explain the challenges that the second
paradigm addresses through a concrete example: the
challenges facing causation jurisprudence in the law of
delict.41 There are aspects to the doctrinal approach to
causation issues that are internalised by legal scholarship
but make little sense for other disciplines. Most impor-
tantly, for lawyers and legal scholars, issues of causation
are never simply a matter of factual relations: they
remain intertwined with issues of the scope of liability.42
This is bound to cause some friction with scientific
accounts of causal connections that treat causation as a
41. I rely here on an earlier analysis of mine. See Bódig (2013), above n. 7.
42. ‘The causal requirements for liability often vary, sometimes quite subtly,
from case to case. And since the causal requirements for liability are
always a matter of law, these variations represent legal differences…’,
Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services (2003) 1 AC 32, at 72, per Lord
Hoffmann. See also T. Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999), at 4-5
and 100-1.
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straightforward factual problem and that keep influenc-
ing legal decisions through the contribution of forensic
experts in court procedures. These frictions cannot be
addressed by simply giving priority to one disciplinary
perspective over the other. The non-instrumental per-
spective of legal scholarship would be an insurmounta-
ble obstacle to that. They can only be handled through a
productive engagement with the alternative disciplinary
perspectives. Inevitably, the terms under which doc-
trines of causation can remain fully intelligible and prac-
ticable will at least partly be dictated by forensic exper-
tise.43
We should be a bit clearer about the dynamics of this
pressure on causation jurisprudence. Its root is the reali-
sation that lawyers and legal scholars simply cannot
ignore the relevant scientific knowledge (or openly con-
tradict scientific evidence) when addressing causation
issues. They are not well positioned to insist that a caus-
al connection is there when they say it is – that they can
develop a self-standing, specifically ‘legal-doctrinal’
sense of causation.44 Simply ignoring what sciences (like
medicine) figure out about causal relations (e.g. on the
causes of a disease) would look downright irrational. It
would raise very serious legitimacy issues about the
epistemic authority and academic credibility of legal
scholars.45 What legal scholars need to achieve is an
acute understanding of how the insights of forensic sci-
ence can be accommodated without subverting the doc-
trinal structures of causation jurisprudence. It means
building competence in forensic science, and it has pro-
duced some important pieces of interdisciplinary legal
scholarship.46 Some say that, at least in the context of
the legal procedure, this has resulted in the mutual ero-
sion of a stark contrast between the legal and the scien-
tific approach to causation (without erasing the salient
differences).47 I would prefer to talk of an ongoing
learning process that has never lost its original focus on
doctrinal integrity. It meant opening up causation doc-
trines to scientific developments but maintaining the
lawyers’ claim to superior interpretative competence in
determining which accounts of causal relations are pref-
erable when dealing with issues of liability.
43. It is worth emphasising that I do not claim that the progress of forensic
knowledge is the only driver of doctrinal development. Other consider-
ations often play a decisive role. But it is one important factor.
44. No doubt, it was sometimes tempting to cut through the complications
by acknowledging that lawyers are free to mean by causation whatever
they see fit. ‘For lawyers, just as 'duty' and 'damage' mean what we
decide they should mean in a legal context, so it should be with the
concept of causation’. M. Hogg, ‘Developing Causal Doctrine’, in
R. Goldberg (ed.), Perspectives on Causation (2011), at 44. But this
approach never came to dominate causation jurisprudence.
45. See G. Edmond and D. Mercer, ‘Rebels without a Cause? Judges, Medi-
cal and Scientific Evidence and the Uses of Causation’, in I. Freckleton
and D. Mendelson (eds.), Causation in Law and Medicine (2002), at
86-7.
46. See R. Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts: Scientific Evi-
dence and Medicinal Product Liability (1999).
47. Cf P. Greenberg, ‘The Cause of Disease and Illness: Medical Views and
Uncertainties’, in I. Freckleton and D. Mendelson (eds.), Causation in
Law and Medicine (2002), at 53.
As we see, in this context, interdisciplinary engagement
means taking on a constant methodological challenge
that comes to drive the development of doctrinal knowl-
edge. In relation to causation issues, it has encouraged
theoretical sophistication to a previously unknown
extent.48 It has brought into focus exciting questions
about the interplay of normative and factual considera-
tions.49 On the other hand, I cannot help thinking that
this paradigm of interdisciplinary engagement still has
not fulfilled its potential for informing and shaping the
broader practice of legal scholarship. Its impact is large-
ly local: it generated ‘pockets’ of a more interdisciplina-
ry minded discourse in legal scholarship. This is regret-
table because the ‘skirmishes’ between different discipli-
nary perspectives have systemic significance for legal
scholarship. Perhaps, this is where legal theory could do
more to draw the epistemological and methodological
lessons from the way discursive mismatches between
disciplinary perspectives come to reflect the epistemo-
logical character of legal scholarship.50
4.3 Doctrinal Knowledge, Policy Initiatives, and
Institutional Design
Let me turn now to a third paradigm of interdisciplinary
engagement. I have mentioned at the beginning of this
section that we can distinguish between two aspects of
the practice of legal scholarship: dealing with the exist-
ing legal materials and engaging with challenges of insti-
tutional design. The two intersect in complex ways, but
the analytical distinction remains a sound one – deter-
minative of the character of legal scholarship. I believe
that the distinction has a bearing on the paradigms of
interdisciplinary engagement. It seems to me that the
first and second paradigms are more closely related to
handling normative materials. With the third one, we
shift the focus to issues of institutional design. The
third paradigm is more closely related to a point that I
have also highlighted above: for contemporary legal
scholarship, issues of institutional design arise in an
intellectual and political environment in which a flood
of policy initiatives keep the law under constant pres-
sure.51 In that environment, competence in policy mat-
ters plays an increasingly important role in preserving
48. In this respect, in the English language literature, Jane Stapleton and
Richard Wright stand out among the doctrinal writers. See J. Stapleton,
‘Scientific and Legal Approaches to Causation’, in I. Freckleton and
D. Mendelson (eds.), Causation in Law and Medicine (2002). J. Staple-
ton, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’, 119
Law Quarterly Review 388 (2003). R. Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’,
73 California Law Review 1735 (1985). R. Wright, ‘Causation, Respon-
sibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics and Proof: Pruning the Bram-
ble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts’, 73 Iowa Law Review 1001
(1988). R. Wright, ‘Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief’, in R.
Goldberg (ed.), Perspectives on Causation (2011).
49. See Bódig (2013), above n. 7.
50. That is the issue that was at the heart of my earlier analysis in Bódig
(2010), above n. 7.
51. I see this as a natural consequence of the way modern political systems
work: a broad range of agents have the (often slight) opportunity to
influence the way the polity is governed. But lasting impact on gover-
nance is only possible if the initiatives are consolidated as legal meas-
ures. Attempts to influence the practice of governance are bound to
take the form of policy proposals to amend the law.
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the influence of legal scholarship over debates on insti-
tutional design. The third paradigm of interdisciplinary
engagement I address is an aspect of handling this chal-
lenge.
It is important to emphasise that the way this pressure
affects legal scholarship reflects a particular feature of
the disciplinary character of law. The pressure is not
really generated by policy preferences internal to legal
scholarship clashing with policy initiatives arising from
extra-legal social and political processes. Legal scholar-
ship is thin in policy content. Even though its concern
with maintaining the integrity, coherence, and rationali-
ty of doctrinal structures has some direct policy implica-
tions,52 legal scholarship exhibits remarkable openness
and flexibility when it comes to absorbing policy prefer-
ences. For a discipline that takes an internalist and
interpretivist perspective on normative materials (and
that, by implication, is premised on deference to what is
already built into the normative structures of law),
internal intellectual resources can hardly generate a
forceful policy agenda. The internal value structures law
(and the ideal of the rule of law in particular) do not
embody blueprints for comprehensive purposive
arrangements of human relations. It is no surprise then
that the tools of doctrinal reasoning legal scholars mas-
ter can be used to support a broad variety of different
policy initiatives (often in direct conflict with each oth-
er). A crucial implication of this is that, contrary to what
one might think, legal scholarship has very limited
potential when it comes to generating independent
visions of institutional design.53 The potential does not
extend far beyond addressing internal dysfunctions that
doctrinal analysis often uncovers.54 The pressure from
ambitious policy initiatives to alter or restructure the
law tends to come from outside legal scholarship.
Under these circumstances, it becomes a challenge for
legal scholarship to make judgements on the merits of
policy initiatives.55 We know that policies cannot be
accommodated in the legal materials without some doc-
52. This is mainly because the rationality of legal materials can be a hotly
contested matter itself.
53. Legal scholars, of course, can be vigorous advocates of law reform.
What I claim is that their preferences for the desired changes in the
content of law or its institutional structures cannot be explained from
considerations internal to doctrinal knowledge. They reflect political
choices that go well beyond the concern with cultivating doctrinal
knowledge.
54. In Britain, this typically takes the form of pointing out some glaring flaw
in the way the case law has developed in a particular area. Here is a
paradigmatic example: ‘The law on recovery in negligence for psy-
chi atric injury where the pursuer has not suffered any physical injury
but has witnessed the death or injury of another has been described as
“confusing and arbitrary”, a “panoply of artificial rules”, “irrational and
unsympathetic”, and “the area where the silliest rules now exist and
where criticism is almost universal”. In fact, it is difficult to think of
another branch of delict that has been subject to such extensive con-
demnation.’ F. Leverick, ‘Counting the Ways of Becoming a Primary
Victim: Anderson v. Christian Salvesen Plc’, 11 Edinburgh Law Review
258 (2007).
55. I elaborate on a point here that I developed elsewhere. See M. Bódig,
‘Doctrinal Knowledge, Legal Doctrinal Scholarship and the Problem of
Interdisciplinary Engagement’, in S. van Praagh and H. Dedek (eds.),
Stateless Law?: Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline (2015).
trinal ‘encoding’. This makes legal scholars crucial
agents in the (essentially political) discourse on how
changes to the law can be implemented without system-
level dysfunctions. But, of course, before addressing the
issue of what the best ways of implementing those poli-
cies are, legal scholars need to make a judgement on
which policies are worth the effort of doctrinal encod-
ing. Exactly because of its propensity to absorb policy
considerations, the doctrinal analysis legal scholars
resort to has precious few internal resources to support
the judgement on the merits of policy initiatives. In this
respect, once again, the essential internalism of the doc-
trinal perspective comes with severe methodological
limitations. Wasting efforts on figuring out doctrinal
models for policy initiatives that are not worth it can
make legal scholars look misguided and hopelessly out
of touch.
This is where interdisciplinary scholarship offers pretty
much the only feasible way to preserve the competence
of legal scholarship in exercising some control over doc-
trinal development. Legal scholars cannot rely on a raw
political logic in taking a stand on the demands to make
changes to the law – without running the risk of looking
cynical. As an academic discipline, legal scholarship
needs academic validation for the substantive ideas that
it chooses to embed in the doctrinal structure of the
existing law. Only other disciplines can vouch for the
claim that, say, ‘indirect discrimination’ is a genuine
problem that calls for new regulation,56 that a crisis of
democracy makes the overhaul of the constitutional
mechanisms of popular representation necessary, or that
we need more imaginative normative tools to address
the human rights aspects of environmental harm. What
these examples suggest is that assessing the worth of
policy initiatives has at least three dimensions – each of
them outside the remit of doctrinal analysis properly so-
called. The first is conceptual clarity: are ideas like ‘wel-
fare dependency’ clear enough to lend itself to practica-
ble solutions by government action in the first place?
The second concerns the plausibility of factual assump-
tions: are there people in significant numbers who can
be described as ‘welfare dependant’? The third dimen-
sion concerns normative plausibility (i.e. the fit with
accepted political and moral values): is proportional rep-
resentation fairer or a better fit for the democratic ideal
than the ‘first past the post’ system of electing the mem-
bers of parliament?
Importantly for us, this does not simply mean that legal
scholarship must pass certain issues on to other disci-
plines. The judgement on the worth of policy initiatives
cannot be simply outsourced. We are talking about
judgements of feasibility that put the professional credi-
bility of legal scholars on the line. That is why they need
to build competence by way of interdisciplinary engage-
ment. They need to be able to find their way around the
56. Initially, UK anti-discrimination law only addressed what we now call
‘direct discrimination’. Prohibiting indirect discrimination as well was
one of the pivotal doctrinal developments in this area, and it happened
when Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 was enacted.
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disciplines related to their own fields of law (be it ecolo-
gy, political sociology, or economics). Otherwise, as I
have pointed out, they risk losing some of their influ-
ence over the way the law will change.
As I have mentioned above, it is indeed more and more
typical that contemporary legal scholars build compe-
tence in other disciplines along these lines. Many of
them see themselves experts for the academic validation
of policy preferences, as well as experts of doctrinal
analysis. I believe that this is an implication of an inter-
esting (and insufficiently analysed) shift in contempo-
rary disciplinary practice. We witness the growing sig-
nificance of interdisciplinary fields of study (on migra-
tion, international conflicts, sustainable development,
climate change policy, energy, etc). Legal scholars gravi-
tate towards these fields (not least because of the attrac-
tive opportunities for research funding), and combining
doctrinal and policy expertise makes it much easier to
establish themselves in any one of them.57
The third paradigm of interdisciplinary engagement
may well be the most significant from a methodological
point of view – the most revealing about the character of
doctrinal knowledge, of legal scholarship, and of the way
doctrinal disciplinarity fits into the broader academic
environment. The shuffling between doctrinal analysis
and the elucidation of the background to policy chal-
lenges is rich in implications for the ways knowledge
from different disciplines (doctrinal and non-doctrinal)
can be reconciled with each other. Focusing on the third
paradigm might offer the best vantage point to under-
standing the strategic importance of getting the terms of
interdisciplinary engagement right in legal scholarship.
It also helps us understand that there is no inherent ten-
sion between the concerns of legal scholarship and poli-
cy-driven approaches to practical challenges. And it cer-
tainly does not make it plausible to think that the law is
a mere institutional tool for implementing policies.
Even though this pattern of interdisciplinary engage-
ment can have a pervasive impact on the agendas for
individual legal scholars, the increased concern with
policy challenges (that animates the third paradigm)
does not obscure the distinctive character of legal schol-
arship. Even in the context of intense interdisciplinary
communication, the primary focus for legal scholarship
remains markedly different from other disciplines.
When it comes to questions about the ways in which the
changing social environment and the shifting commit-
ments to political values interact with the normative
functioning of legal institutions, we might be concerned
with two clearly different sets of considerations. We can
be interested in how the law affects its social environ-
ment and whether it offers a viable opportunity to insti-
tutionalise important political ideals. Or, alternatively,
we can be concerned with the ways in which the chang-
ing social and political environment affects the condi-
tions of maintaining the doctrinal coherence of the nor-
57. [In contemporary universities, we see the emergence of] interdisciplina-
ry research centres that are welcoming for legal scholars (e.g.…). Nar-
row doctrinal focus, however, is not rewarded.
mative elements of law. That is, we might want to know
the consequences for the law of the shifting patterns of
knowledge about social and political relations, ideals and
attitudes, as well as institutional realities. Legal scholar-
ship (due to its noninstrumentalist take on law) stands
alone among the disciplines with its obvious focus on
the latter point. Without its contribution, the question
of how the social environment affects the law (as
opposed to how the law affects the social environment)
and what can and cannot be done without undermining
the doctrinal structures of law would be left without
adequate academic reflection.
It is also important to point out that my characterisation
of the third paradigm is designed to draw a marked con-
trast to an alternative model of interdisciplinary engage-
ment that has proved enduringly attractive among legal
scholars. This alternative model would derive the oppo-
site conclusion from the inherently plausible idea that
legal scholarship needs to engage more with the social
and political environment in which the law operates. It
concludes that legal scholarship must learn more about
the social consequences of operating the characteristic
legal mechanisms. Memorably, American legal realists
often argued along these lines,58 and Richard Posner
also formulated a similar position when assessing how
legal theory and legal scholarship could be helpful for
legal practitioners. Posner stands for a shift towards a
more ’consequentialist’ paradigm in legal scholarship.59
The attraction of this line of reasoning is understanda-
ble. It is undeniable that those who make legislative or
judicial decisions must be sensitive to the social conse-
quences of their actions (the impact they make on actual
people’s lives). If legal scholarship engages with the way
those decisions affect the law, it is tempting to think that
it will have to replicate this sensitivity to social conse-
quences. The problem with this logic, however, is that it
ignores the specific epistemological character of legal
scholarship. It ignores what legal scholarship can do
well: understanding the consequences of institutional
changes for doctrinal knowledge (as opposed to under-
standing the impact of law on social and political
changes). In fact, when it comes to the impact the law
makes on society, other disciplines – and sociology and
economics in particular – are far better positioned than
legal scholarship. And it is certain to stay that way. Even
though what these disciplines figure out about the social
consequences of law are a huge inspiration for legal
scholarship, we must accept a natural division of labour
here. Legal scholarship must focus on what it can do
better than other disciplines.
58. See, e.g., K. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism’, 44 Harvard Law
Review 1222, at 1249 (1931).
59. As is well known, this is a strong motive in Posner’s writings – in rela-
tion to the theoretical support judges need from the academia. See,
e.g., R. Posner, ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’, 111 Har-
vard Law Review 1637 (1998).
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5 Conclusion
I have organised this analysis around three paradigms of
interdisciplinary engagement in legal scholarship: (1)
understanding better the ‘footprints’ of other disciplines
in law, (2) managing discursive encounters that can gen-
erate frictions between disciplinary perspectives, and (3)
building the knowledge base to handle challenge of vali-
dating policy initiatives for their feasibility. My claims
about the paradigms were grounded in an account of the
disciplinary character of legal scholarship that puts the
commitment to cultivating doctrinal knowledge about
the law at the centre. I have focused on the challenges
legal scholars cannot tackle without communicating
with other disciplines or even without building some
competence in other disciplines. Legal doctrinal schol-
arship is in a constant need of renewing its arsenal of
doctrinal constructs. Without it, it would struggle to
deal with the influx of knowledge into legal scholarship
from other disciplines. Interdisciplinary engagement
necessitates as well as facilitates this renewal. It remains
crucial for finding the adequate knowledge base for legal
scholarship, as well as for enabling legal scholarship to
adapt to its ever-changing social and disciplinary envi-
ronment.
My analysis was only preliminary in important respects.
Most importantly, I focused on demonstrating the ana-
lytical distinctions between the paradigms. That meant
setting aside issues of their overlaps and intersections
and the ways in which interdisciplinary engagement can
move (or even have to move) from one paradigm to the
other. It can turn out that philosophical accounts of cor-
rective justice are not that supportive of the existing
doctrinal structures of the law negligence. What starts
off as an attempt to gain a better understanding of what
is in the law may end up managing frictions between
disciplinary perspectives. Managing the frictions
between disciplinary perspectives can lead to challenges
of institutional design, and thereby creating space for a
different kind of interdisciplinary engagement. And
when a policy initiative comes to be embedded in the
law (like it is happening to the ‘precautionary principle’
in the context of environmental law right now60), han-
dling policy challenges can morph into trying to under-
stand better what is in the law already. Many important
implications of my analysis can only be clarified in light
of a more comprehensive analysis that factors in the
complex dynamics of actual interdisciplinary scholar-
ship. That more comprehensive analysis, however, was
beyond the scope of the present paper.
60. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, 2012, Article 191(2). See also N. de Sadeleer, ‘The
Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law’, 12 Euro-
pean Law Journal 139 (2006).
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